Showing posts sorted by date for query texas. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query texas. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Wednesday, August 1, 2018

Yes, Sarah and Jennifer Hart played the lesbian card

By now I have read so much about the white lesbian mothers who murdered their six adopted black children, Cierra, Jeremiah, Abigail, Markis, Hannah, and Devonte Hart, that I did not think I would have anything to add.  But I sat down to review the 2013 file released by Oregon CPS anyway.

The investigation in Oregon was triggered by two reports of child endangerment, one claiming the children were malnourished and the other reporting Jennifer's harsh punishment of the children. The file includes the information provided to Oregon CPS by Minnesota Child Welfare about incidents when the family lived in that state going back to 2010, including Sarah's domestic violence conviction in 2011 for her physical abuse of one child.  (Before 2010 - in 2008 - Hannah, then 6, went to school with a large bruise and reported that her mother hit her, but the authorities believed the couple's explanation that Hannah fell down the stairs and nothing came of the allegation.) Most of the reports in Minnesota came from the children's teachers, and immediately after the report that triggered the criminal charges, Jennifer and Sarah removed the children from school and began to home school them.

Naturally, the Oregon investigator asked the couple about their involvement with Child Welfare in Minnesota.  And that part of the report is where I found a detail that I think no one else has reported.  "Ms. J. Hart and Ms. S. Hart," the report states, "believe they have been targeted due to being a vegetarian, lesbian couple who married and adopted high risk, abused children..." Yes, that's right.  They played the lesbian card, attempting to deflect attention from how they actually treated their children by claiming to be victims of homophobia.

I'm not saying Oregon CPS was fooled by the couple's claim.  An investigator spoke to each child alone, and none reported abuse or the withholding of food. (The report does note that "the children provided nearly identical answers to all questions asked.").  Each child was evaluated by a doctor, who expressed no concerns even though five of the six children were so small they were not on the growth chart.  The disposition of the Oregon CPS investigation was "unable to determine," meaning that "there are some indications of child abuse or neglect, but there is insufficient data to conclude that there is reasonable cause to believe that child abuse or neglect occurred."

The couple subsequently moved to Washington, and of course we know that state's investigation was about to get underway, prompted by the children begging a neighbor for food and help, when Jennifer and Sarah headed south with the children, and Jennifer drove their SUV off a cliff and into the Pacific Ocean in California.

I consider it good news that coverage of this tragedy has not been accompanied by calls to ban gay and lesbian adoption.  But the bad news is this:  At least for the children born to Texas mom Sherry Davis (Devonte, Jeremiah, and Cierra), there was a kinship adoption proceeding that the Texas courts rejected.  And that was its own, independent tragedy.  Priscilla Celestine lost her bid to adopt the children because she allowed the children's mother, Sherry, to see them while she was at work.  The social worker made an unannounced visit and took the children away instantly.  There was no allegation that Sherry harmed or endangered the children during the visit, just that contact with Sherry was prohibited. Priscilla continued her efforts to regain custody of the children through the Texas courts, losing at each step.

Sherry Davis lost her parental rights because she was a cocaine addict.  Now consider this: The state of Texas paid the Harts close to $2000 a month as an adoption subsidy, for a total of about $277,000 over most of a decade.  Let's assume (and I don't know if this is true), that half of that was for Sherry Davis's biological children.  Imagine if the state had made available to Sherry $1000 a month for drug addiction treatment and other assistance, every month for almost 10 years.  Sherry did get clean, but not fast enough for the state of Texas.  Or the federal government for that matter, which mandates pursuant to the Adoption and Safe Families Act that states move to terminate parental rights after 15 months, even though successful drug treatment often takes longer than that.  Devonte, Jeremiah, and Cierra could have had an extended family and, ultimately, their mother also, if the state had permitted the children to remain with Priscilla.

At one time, Sarah and Jennifer Hart might have been the poster couple for same-sex marriage, a white lesbian couple who adopted two black sibling groups out of foster care.  Judge Posner would have loved them, and I would have hated his reasons for doing so, as I wrote about here.  LGBT advocacy groups would do well to remember that many of the children in foster care and available for adoption should not be there; that the state is too quick to remove children from economically disadvantaged mothers of color, some of them lesbian and bisexual mothers; and that the solution to the disproportionate number of black children in the foster care system is not more adoption by same-sex couples but more resources to the families those children come from, including safe and affordable housing, adequate drug treatment, and other components of a robust social and economic safety net.  Since by now we know that LGBT individuals are disproportionately poor, incarcerated, homeless, and food insecure, such a safety net should be as important to the LGBT family agenda as stopping discrimination against same-sex couples who want to be foster and adoptive parents.


Tuesday, March 4, 2014

Regnerus testifies and is cross examined...and the University of Texas Department of Sociology issues disclaimer

THIS I find unusual.  The Sociology Department of the University of Texas has issued a statement that the testimony of Mark Regnerus in the Michigan second-parent adoption/same-sex marriage case does not reflect the views of that Department or of the American Sociological Association.  I can't remember ever seeing anything like that!

As I wrote about last week, the best place to follow the trial is the blog of Michigan attorney Jane Bassett, but I also recommend this Twitter feed from Trea Baldas, which provides short real time updates.  Maybe others are not as transfixed as I am, but what this court decides about Regnerus's testimony is going to have a huge impact on LGBT family litigation going forward.

To me, by his own admission, he is not saying it is worse for children to stay in foster care than to be adopted by a lesbian or gay parent.  He is not saying it is worse for a child to be adopted by a same-sex couple than by a single lesbian or gay parent.  He is not saying that blocking same-sex marriage will keep lesbians and gay men from raising children.  I just cannot see how his testimony helps the state.  He is certainly saying that children do best with their married biological parents.  He doesn't like married heterosexuals using donor eggs or sperm, but he would not prohibit it.  Nor would he categorically prohibit all sorts of other people whose children have so-called less desirable outcomes (e.g., people with less money or education) from adopting children or getting married.

As a legal matter, the significance of Regnerus's testimony depends to some degree on what level of "scrutiny," in Equal Protection terms, the court applies to the state's bans on second-parent adoption and same-sex marriage.  Under the most basic form of rational basis review, the state's argument about what the bans accomplish doesn't have to be very good; it just can't be irrational.  A decade ago, a federal appeals court found that Florida's ban on gay adoption wasn't irrational, but that ban is gone, thanks to a more recent state court ruling finding it irrational indeed.  And it is going to be hard for the state to argue going forward that the US Supreme Court's ruling in Windsor last summer leaves sexual orientation classifications under the barest form of rational basis review.

If you want to stay tuned, just check in a few times a day with the websites above.  And thanks to the writers for making it possible for the rest of us to get these details.

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

Why the trial in Michigan Federal Court really matters....and how to follow it closely

I wrote last fall about DeBoer v. Snyder, and the trial in the case is upon us.  This case began as a challenge to Michigan's refusal to grant second-parent adoptions, and it has, thanks to a federal court judge who all but insisted, turned into a challenge to Michigan's ban on same-sex marriage.  I criticized the conflation of adoption and marriage in my earlier posts and won't repeat them here.  But the trial began yesterday, and it is time to sit up and take notice.

I suspect many people will see the Michigan case as just one in a string of cases, especially with so many federal court judges striking down same-sex marriage bans.  (A Texas judge did so just today).  But there is a big difference.  The Michigan judge ordered a trial, a factfinding process after which he will rule.  The only other recent case that went to a full trial was the "Prop 8" Perry case in California.  But DeBoer is significantly different from Perry.  The defenders of Prop 8 offered no meaningful expert testimony in support of the ban on same-sex marriage. (They called to the stand David Blankenhorn, who tried and failed, under withering cross examination by David Boies.)

The state of Michigan is going a different route.  It is trying to get the court to rule that children do best when raised by their married, heterosexual, biological parents, and that therefore the state is justified in prohibiting second-parent adoption and same-sex marriage. So far, without holding trials, the recent court rulings against same-sex marriage bans have all found arguments like that in DeBoer unfounded. But DeBoer will involve witnesses and factfinding based on their testimony.

Michigan is calling Mark Regnerus, whose study supposedly showing that children raised by same-sex couples do worse than children of married heterosexuals, was the subject of immense professional criticism two years ago.  Regnerus counted those with a parent who had any same-sex sexual relationship, however fleeting, as raised by gay or lesbian parents, even though very few of the children lived with a parent and a parent's partner for any length of time.  None of those studied had been raised from birth by a same-sex couple.  Look for ACLU attorney Leslie Cooper to do a stunning cross-examination of Regnerus.  (For a preview, check out the criticism of Regnerus in this Lambda Legal brief in an earlier case). Adoption expert David Brodzinsky, a witness for the plaintiffs, has already critiqued the Regnerus study and offered his own opinion that denying parentage to both adoptive parents (as well as marriage) is bad for the children.  Because the children of the plaintiffs were all adopted from the state foster care system, his testimony is especially valuable in this case.

Anyone interested in following this trial has an amazing resource -- the live blogging of attorney Jane Bassett, who practices LGBT family law and elder law in Michigan.  She covered yesterday's full day of trial in 11 updates.  Today was a short day, and she provided 2 updates.  She'll be back at it tomorrow, when the plaintiffs offer LGBT demographer extraordinaire, Gary Gates, as their next witness.  Because Jane Bassett understands the law and the issues in this case so well, I trust her more than the newspaper sources covering the trial.

If the judge insists on striking down Michigan's marriage ban, I sure hope he separately strikes down the ban on second-parent adoption.  I know the plaintiffs are trying to get him to do that, and I commend the plaintiffs, who have always sought dual parentage, not marriage, as their main goal.  I'll be following Jane Bassett's blog every day until the trial ends.

Saturday, May 25, 2013

Texas lesbian mom ordered to stop living with her partner

By complete coincidence, just after I posted earlier this week about restrictions on the custody and visitation rights of gay and lesbian parents, an example of that very thing hit the national news. Carolyn Compton, the mother of a 10 and a 13 year old, and her partner, Page Price, were ordered to separate in order to comply with a provision in Compton's 2011 divorce decree that no unmarried romantic partner could spend the night when the children were present.  The judge gave Price 30 days to move out.  If she doesn't, the judge could award Compton's ex-husband custody of the children (although no coverage I have seen mentions that). Here is one report that focused on the potential unconstitutionality of the restriction, saying it was ultimately a question for the US Supreme Court.

But as I wrote in my previous post, the Constitution isn't the issue, and Compton is not going to win going down that route.  The issue is how the children are doing and what their relationship with Price is like.  According to an article in the Dallas Morning News, a "morality clause" banning unmarried overnight romantic partners is standard in several Texas counties.  Some accounts focus on the fact that Price and Compton cannot marry, but, as the article I recently published points out, the marital status of the couple should have no significance whatsoever.  The focus should be on the children.  If a parent remarries and the presence of the spouse is harmful to the children, the fact of the marriage doesn't solve anything and should not absolve the parent from an assessment of whether that parent's choices are good for the children.

For the record, I do believe restrictions on parents' sexual relationships violate their Constitutional rights, but no court in a custody or visitation case has ever ruled in favor of a gay or lesbian parent on Constitutional grounds. Plenty of courts have ruled for gay and lesbian parents by finding that the parent's relationship was having no adverse impact on the children.  A few years back, a Tennessee appeals court struck down an automatic provision against the presence of "paramours" (although the court had to do it twice before the trial court would comply).

In my previous post I pointed out that anything a parent does that harms a child should be considered in determining custody and visitation, and that nothing about having a nonmarital partner should be treated differently from any other decision a parent makes.  I wouldn't expect Texas to embrace precisely that principle, but it's not too much to expect that an appeals court might require an inquiry, with actual evidence, into the well-being of the children.  The couple has made a statement that Price's move will be disruptive and harmful to the children.  I can believe it.  I hope an appeals court tells the trial judge he has to make an assessment about this family and these children rather than enforce a blanket provision against the presence of unmarried partners.  Even in Texas, I believe that's possible.

Saturday, February 23, 2013

What's the matter with Kansas? NOTHING if you are the child of a lesbian couple

This is how parentage should be determined. The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled yesterday, in Frazier v. Goudschaal, that two children born through donor insemination to a lesbian couple are the children of both parents.  The court interpreted Kansas parentage law to create presumptive parentage for a woman who "notoriously or in writing" recognizes parentage of the child.  The statute itself says "recognizes paternity," but because Kansas is one of the states that incorporates the paternity provisions into determinations of the mother and child relationship "insofar as practicable," the court applied them to the petition of Marci Frazier, the nonbiological mother of the children her partner, Kelly Goudschaal, gave birth to.  The court specifically stated that under Kansas parentage law two parents can be of the same sex. The couple had a coparenting agreement denominating Frazier a "de facto parent," and the court determined that it did not violate public policy to enforce the agreement as long as it was in the children's best interests.

The facts of the case are ordinary enough.  The children had a hyphenated surname and called Frazier "mother" or "mom." They lived as a family unit, and teachers and daycare providers treated the couple as equal parents. The couple split up when the children were about 3 and 5 years old.  They maintained equal parenting time for about six months.  Then Goudschall began reducing Frazier's time with the girls, and shortly thereafter she announced that she was moving to Texas and taking the girls with her.  That prompted Frazier to take court action. The trial court ordered joint legal custody with primary physical custody to Goudschall and reasonable visitation rights to Frazier.

The court rejected Goudschall's argument that Frazier could not be a mother because she was not a biological or adoptive parent, and that her biological maternity automatically rebutted any presumption Frazier might have.  The opinion principally discusses the written agreement of the parties.  A nonbiological mom without a written agreement should still be able to prevail in Kansas, however, because the statute the court applied does not require a writing; "notoriously" recognizing the child is sufficient. A concurring opinion focused only on parentage under the Kansas Parentage Act, citing California's Elisa B. case and New Mexico's Chatterjee case as precedent.

As always happens, Goudschaal cited Troxel v. Granville for the proposition that she has a constitutionally protected right to raise her child.  The court agreed, but found that she exercised that right when she entered the coparenting agreement.  The court actually said she should be able to enter an agreement to share custody "without having the government interfere by nullifying that agreement, so long as it is in the best interests of the children."  This is an interesting twist on the constitutional right of a parent; it suggests that if a court ignores such an agreement that is interference with the parent's rights.

The court here gave more focus to the children than is sometimes found in cases about the status of a nonbiological parent.  It called them third party beneficiaries of the coparenting agreement.  It found they had a reliance interest in maintaining two parents and avoiding the harm of severing the attachments they formed as a result of the agreement. "So what Goudschall really wants is to renege on the coparenting agreement without regard to the rights of or harm to the children, all in the name of constitutionally protected parental rights," wrote the court.  It continued, "Surely, her constitutional rights do not stretch that far."  The court did not want the children to "suffer the consequences of their biological mother's change of heart."

The court also cited Supreme Court precedent for the principle that  "all children -- both legitimate and illegitimate -- be afforded equal treatment under the law." Denying the Goudschaal-Frazier children the opportunity to have two parents ("the same as children of a traditional marriage")  would violate the children's constitutional rights.  Note how far this is from the argument that same-sex couples must be allowed to marry to provide their children with equal rights.  This opinion might actually be the strongest statement that a couple should not have to marry to provide two parents for their children.  This is the diametrically opposite result to that in New York, where the Debra H. case held that a child has two parents if the couple is married but only one if the couple isn't married.

The difference in the New York and Kansas opinions are to a large extent dependent on the parentage statutes of the two states.  It's not that Kansas has a gay-friendly statute.  It's that the Uniform Parentage Act, on which the Kansas statute is based, does not require marriage or biology for a finding of legal parentage.  How sensible for all children.

Congratulations and thanks are due to the ACLU, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and Washburn University School of Law Children and Family Law Center (under the able leadership of Professor Linda Elrod), for the friend of the courts brief they filed in support of Frazier and her children.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Transgender Parents -- Then, Now, and the Future

A trial court concludes it is in the best interests of four daughters to change custody from their mother to their father because their mother was “going through a transsexual change” from female to male.  The mother had changed her name to Mark, and, after the father petitioned for the custody change, Mark married a woman.  Reversing, the appeals court quotes the statutory requirement that “the court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship with the child," and finds no adverse impact on the mother’s relationship with the children or on their emotional development.

A trial court terminates the parental rights of a father after he undergoes sex reassignment surgery and becomes a woman.  Affirming, the state supreme court finds that “Suzanne, in a very real sense, has terminated her own parental rights as a father.  It was strictly Tim Daly's choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the role of a female who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter.”

Contrary to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, and in spite of finding that the father was the more nurturing parent, a trial court awards primary custody of two children to their mother rather than their father, who was transitioning to become a woman. The trial court reasons that "[Robbie] has indicated she will be undergoing sexual reassignment surgery sometime in the very near future. [The] surgery may be everything she has hoped for, or it may be disastrous. No one knows what is ahead, and the impact of gender reassignment surgery on the children is unknown."  Affirming, the appeals court finds that the trial court properly “focused on the children's need for ‘environmental and parental stability’."


            The above snapshots are from three cases, one decided in 1973, one in 1986, and one in 2007.  Which case do you imagine goes with which year?  Take a moment and think about that before you keep reading.

The cases are listed in chronological order.  The unequivocal win for the transgender parent – indeed the only unequivocal win for a transgender parent in any reported appellate decision to date – came in Colorado, in 1973, in Christian v. Randall.[1]  The second case is from Nevada in 1986,[2] and the third from Washington in 2007.[3]

These results are surprising only if one assumes that LGBT parents once faced virtually insurmountable barriers to retaining custody of their children after a divorce, and that those barriers have eased, or even disappeared, in recent years.   It’s the mistake of thinking that Lawrence v. Texas is more important to the custody rights of LGBT parents than Roe v. Wade.

Actually, neither of these cases is directly relevant to approval of LGBT parents raising children.  No court has ever decided in favor of LGBT parenting on federal constitutional grounds, including arguments derived from Lawrence.  But the era of Roe v. Wade, decided the same year as Christian v. Randall, was an era of possibility whose dimensions have been largely ignored in the history of LGBT rights.

That era of possibility has a name:  the sexual revolution.

In 1973, “make love, not war” was a universally known slogan, capturing both popular opposition to the war in Vietnam and the cultural changes that made openly conducted sex outside of marriage increasingly widespread and acceptable.  “Open marriages” were documented more with interest than condemnation. The feminist movement championed a woman’s right to control her own body, demanding, among other things, the end to criminal abortion laws that Roe in part accomplished.  That movement also insisted on the equal employment opportunities promised in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the end to patriarchal marriage, in public laws and private homes.

Roe is only one of the important cases from this era.  The same year, 1973, the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional in USDA v. Moreno to deny food stamps to hippie communes, a widely recognized locus for acting out the sexual revolution; there were four votes that year, in Frontiero v. Richardson, for requiring classifications based on sex to withstand strict scrutiny; the year before the Court had ruled in Eisenstadt v. Baird that single women could not be denied access to birth control.

The movement for gay rights and liberation that grew out of Stonewall in 1969 could take advantage of – as well as contribute to – the greater permissiveness of the sexual revolution.  Its demands also dovetailed with the feminist movement’s demands for both equality and freedom.  Add in the increased availability of no fault divorce, which began in California in 1969, and the times were ripe for lesbians and gay men who had married for conventional respectability to leave those marriages and come out.  Custody disputes commonly ensued.

Many parents did lose custody of their children after coming out, but not all did.  Just as the sexual revolution and feminist calls for change had an impact on Supreme Court Justices, so they affected state trial and appellate judges.  It is in that climate that the Colorado appeals court ruled that being transgender was not sufficient basis to lose custody.

The sexual revolution ended.  The backlash began.  The Equal Rights Amendment failed.  Sex was never declared a suspect classification.  Future Supreme Courts chipped away at Roe.  Demands for equality and freedom were met head on with arguments for morality and “traditional values.” Bowers v. Hardwick was proof of those arguments’ success.  Daly and Bowers were decided in the same year.

In the mid-1990’s, the arguments shifted, relying more on social order than morality.  Opponents claimed life-long heterosexual marriage as the optimal structure within which to raise children and blamed other family forms for all social and economic problems.  Those arguments persist today, continuing to deflect attention from the wealth inequality and racism that bear primary responsibility for poverty, inadequate public education, health disparities, and other blights on our democracy.

In the aggregate, lesbian and gay parents raise children in a more supportive legal and cultural environment than that which existed in previous decades.  But virulent pockets of resistance remain.  For transgender parents, there is overwhelming resistance.  The Magnuson decision, from generally LGBT-friendly Washington state, is an example of that.

            I’m optimistic that outcomes for transgender parents in custody disputes will improve.  But I was optimistic in the mid-1970’s also, imagining that Roe, Eisenstadt, Moreno, and the momentum of the sexual revolution and feminism, all pointed towards ever-increasing freedom and support for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people, our relationships and our families.  I’m humbler now about my predictions.
This entry is a repost from Balkinization, which posted submissions from all the speakers at the conference held at UCLA last month, Liberty/Equality:  The View from Roe's 40th and Lawrence's 10th Anniversaries. Video of the speakers is available at the William Institute website here.





[1] 516 P. 2d 132 (Colo. App. 1973)
[2] Daly v. Daly, 715 P. 2d 56 (Nev. 1986).  For a more recent opinion affirming the termination of a transgender parent’s parental rights, see M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31 (Ky. App. 2007).
[3] Magnuson v. Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65 (Wash. App. 2007).

Sunday, July 8, 2012

Another court misapplies Troxel v Granville and so another nonbio mom loses in Texas

Last month (while I was on my blogging hiatus), the Texas Court of Appeals (Ninth District) ruled against Dana Ruppert's efforts to retain a relationship with the child born while she was living with the child's biological mother, Stephanie Wells.  The facts in the opinion are sparse, but the law is unmistakable.

The opinion reports that the couple began living together before the child, M.J., was born and that their relationship ended in April 2010 with the nonbio mom moving out.  (No indication when the child was born or his age).  The couple did divide care of M.J., and in May they agreed in writing that each would have certain periods of time with him.  The next month Wells stopped the visits, but she allowed them to resume in November 2010.  Between November 2010 and August 2011, the child lived with Ruppert about 50% of the time.  After Wells again stopped the contact, Ruppert filed a court action in November 2011 requesting sole custody and alleging that Wells was abusive towards the child.  The trial court held a hearing.  It did not find that Wells was unfit.  It awarded temporary primary custody to Wells but did give Ruppert weekends and 2012 spring break with M.J.  The appeals court summarized the testimony as showing that Ruppert "filled a role in co-parenting" M.J. when Wells allowed it.

The trial court allowed Ruppert's claim to proceed because it ruled that, as required by Texas law, Ruppert exercised "actual care" and "actual possession" of M.J. for at least six months, ending no more than 90 days  before Ruppert filed for custody.  But the appeals court said she did not have actual "control" of the child, also required, because Wells could change her mind at any time and because Wells made decisions about M.J.'s school.  Wells had given Ruppert written consent to make medical decisions for M.J., but the appeals court said this did not amount to "control" because she never actually had to make any such decisions.

Most disturbing as a legal matter, the court believed its interpretation of the Texas statute was required by the US Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel v. Granville.  I have written about courts' interpretations of Troxel in numerous posts.  Here is an example of how the Wells court gets it wrong.  "While the desirability of compelling Wells to allow Ruppert a right to visitation might be debatable, when viewed from the child's point of view, Troxel does not allow a court to second-guess a fit parent's decision."

Wrong.  Troxel involved grandparents who had never functioned as parents of the children at issue.  The Supreme Court said there were no "special factors" giving a trial court the power to decide that the children's best interests would be served by visiting with their grandparents.  The situation of a same-sex couple raising a child together from birth is just the sort of "special factor" that distinguishes it from Troxel. Fortunately, many courts have acknowledged this distinction.  But many miss the point entirely and treat Troxel as a decision that draws a bright line around a biological or adoptive parent and allows no court challenge to her custody or decision about visitation unless she is unfit.  That's what theNinth District Texas Court of Appeals has done, and the children raised by same-sex couples in the Beaumont, Texas area are the worse off for it.

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Texas Supreme Court lets stand lower court order registering the parentage judgment of a gay male couple

On September 30, the Texas Supreme Court denied review in a case brought by the nonbiological father of a child born using his ex-partner's sperm to a California surrogate mother. The couple, Jerry Berwick and Richard Wagner, lived in Texas, and had a child in December 2005 pursuant to a gestational surrogacy contract in California. Berwick is the biological father. Pursuant to agreements filed in the California court by the two men, the surrogate, and her husband, the California court issued a pre-birth parentage judgment naming the two men the child's legal parents. The order was stayed until the child's birth, as is customary with a pre-birth order. Upon the child's birth, a birth certificate was issued naming both men as parents (although, oddly, Wagner was listed in the space denominated "mother.")

The couple raised the child as two parents in Texas until 2008 when Berwick ended the relationship. Ever since, he has been arguing that he is the child's only parent. And, as we have seen too often before, he is represented by the anti-gay Alliance Defense Fund (ADF).

Wagner, represented by Ken Upton in the south central office of Lambda Legal, filed to register the California judgment in Texas pursuant to a statute that exists in every state. Those statutes, part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), mandate that every state register child custody judgments from other states and give them Full Faith and Credit. The ADF lawyers argued that the parentage judgment did not determine "child custody" and therefore did not fall under the statute. In a decision last February, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled in Wagner's favor. Because the California judgment established that the birth mother and her husband were not the child's legal parents, it did determine that Berwick and Wagner would have custody of the child and the "presumed" parents (the woman who gives birth and her husband) would not. It is that ruling which the Texas Supreme Court declined to review two weeks ago. According to the Texas Supreme Court website, Berwick can still file a motion for rehearing next week.

That's not the end of it. It never is with ADF (or its fellow traveler, Liberty Counsel, who represents Lisa Miller in the long-running Miller-Jenkins litigation.) Berwick is still arguing in the lower court that Wagner is not a parent. Stay tuned.

Friday, August 12, 2011

Numerous organizations and scholars join Lambda Legal in asking the US Supreme Court to hear Adar v. Smith

Six friend of the court briefs were filed this week asking the US Supreme Court to hear Adar v. Smith, the case of the gay male couple denied an accurate revised birth certificate for the Louisiana-born child they adopted in New York. Lambda Legal represents the couple and filed a cert petition on their behalf last month.

Lambda's press release Thursday summarizes and links to the six briefs.

It is never an easy decision to ask the Supreme Court to hear a gay rights case. There is always the possibility of losing, thereby making bad law for the entire country. But the Fifth Circuit en banc ruling in Adar, which I wrote about here, has the potential to make mischief beyond the states that are bound by it (Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi).

Lambda deserves huge credit for their representation of this couple and their coordination of the friend of the court briefs filed in support of the cert petition. I am one of the more than two dozen family law professors named as amici in one of the briefs, and I want to give a special shout out to Joan Hollinger at UC Berkeley and Courtney Joslin at UC Davis, as well as the National Center for Lesbian Rights, for their work on this brief. As I reviewed the list of fellow family law profs on this brief -- most heterosexual and without a primary focus in their work on LGBT families -- I am also grateful that so many highly respected scholars care enough about our families and the children we raise to lend their considerable prestige to this case.

We won't hear back from the Supreme Court until October.

Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Adar v. Smith continued...why two gay dads still have no birth certificate for their son

When Oren Adar and Mickey Smith sued the state of Louisiana in federal district court, they claimed that the state registrar violated their constitutional rights by refusing to issue a birth certificate for their child listing both of them as parents. The US Constitution requires each state to give "full faith and credit" to the judgments of the courts of other states. So Adar and Smith claimed that Louisiana's refusal to create an amended birth certificate accurately representing their status as adoptive parents was a violation of the Full Faith and Credit clause.

When the Fifth Circuit ruled against them yesterday, it held that no such suit could be filed in federal district court. The Full Faith and Credit clause, the court ruled, requires Louisiana state courts to respect the adoption decree. According to this reasoning, the couple should have brought suit in Louisiana state court and if they lost there the only recourse would be asking the US Supreme Court to hear the case. According to the majority, the couple simply cannot sue the state in federal court for violating their right to receive Full Faith and Credit for their New York adoption decree.

The majority acknowledges that the 10th Circuit ruled otherwise, but here is how they distinguish that case. Oklahoma had a statute refusing to recognize out-of-state adoptions by same-sex couples. Louisiana, according to the court, not only has no such statute but admits that its courts must recognize Adar and Smith as the parents of their child. The court would have us believe that refusing to issue a birth certificate is not a failure to recognize the couple's parentage but is simply a refusal to enforce that parentage in a particular way. And the court notes that the state is willing to issue a new birth certificate in light of the New York adoption decree, but only by listing the name of one of the fathers as a parent.

There is a very strong five-judge dissent in the case, often using hyperbole and exclamation points to convey the depth of its rejection of the majority's reasoning. To the state's argument that it is willing to provide a new birth certificate with one father's name (an offer the dissent calls "Solomonesque"), the dissent notes, "I have searched the Constitution in vain for a 'Half Faith and Credit Clause.'" The dissent concludes that the couple is able to file a federal civil rights claim and that the state has indeed violated their right to have full faith and credit accorded their New York adoption.

According to the dissent, FF and C could not require Louisiana to issue new birth certificates at all for children after they are adopted. But since they have chosen to do so, Adar and Smith have a right to have their adoption treated the same way as all out of state adoptions. The dissent relies on the state statute that says the vital records registrar shall issue new birth certificates. The only thing unsettling about this reasoning is that it suggests a different analysis would apply if Louisiana had -- like Texas -- a statute explicitly forbidding issuance of a new birth certificate to unmarried adoptive parents. Then, presumably, there would only be an equal protection claim.

And speaking of the equal protection claim, which I discussed yesterday, the dissent and two of the concurring judges thought the en banc court should not have ruled on that issue because neither the district court ruling nor the panel ruling of the 5th Circuit addressed it. Nonetheless, the dissent has an interesting take on how the equal protection claim should be analyzed. The dissent believes the appropriate comparator group is unmmarried biological parents rather than married adoptive parents. Since Louisiana issues birth certificates with the names of two unmarried biological parents, the dissent asserts, it cannot justify denying a birth certificate to unmarried adoptive parents. Interesting twist. The dissent also points out that the birth certificate laws are about containing accurate and complete information and that the state's ban on adoption by an unmarried couple is in no way affected by requiring the state to issue an accurate birth certificate for this child.

Lambda Legal is considering whether to ask the US Supreme Court to review this en banc decision.

Thursday, March 17, 2011

Arkansas court skeptical of reasons for banning unmarried couples from adopting or fostering children

It's always risky to predict the outcome of a case based on oral argument. Nonetheless, I'll predict that the Arkansas Supreme Court will affirm the decision of a trial judge in Cole v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services that the state's ban on adoption and fostering by anyone living with a nonmarital partner violates the state's constitution. The ban was enacted by voters in 2008. You can watch the argument on the court's website here. Although a lawyer for the state did argue briefly, the lawyer who primarily argued for upholding the ban represented the intervenors, the Family Council Action Committee, the Arkansas group behind placing the matter on the ballot in 2008. The plaintiffs are represented by the ACLU, which has once again done a top notch job.

Before the US Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that its criminal prohibition on private consensual sex in the home violated the state's constitution. The importance of that case, Jegley v. Picado, played a large role in today's hearing. The trial court found the ban a violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights as articulated in Jegley. The appellants disagree, arguing that the ban is nothing like the intrusion of criminalizing behavior in the home. The justices did not appear to buy it. They repeatedly returned to the fundamental right articulated in Jegley and expressed skepticism that the ban was anything but a direct and substantial burden on the exercise of that right.

If the ban violates the fundamental right of the plaintiffs then it cannot stand unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. But if there is no fundamental right at stake, then the ban survives as long as it has a "rational basis." The intervenors and the state argued that the rational basis test allows the generalization that, as a group, the homes of "cohabiting" couples are less stable and more volatile than other homes, and that therefore an individual review of each applicant in such a situation is not required, even though some of those homes would be suitable.

When one of the justices asked the lawyer for the intervenors if he conceded he would lose if the court applied "heightened scrutiny," he said no. He said the "life" of the child was at stake (that's how he characterized the state's interest on several occasions) and that the state couldn't be required to place children in the "riskiest" and "poorest performing" home environments.

In what was perhaps the most astonishing part of the argument by the appellants, both lawyers asserted that the state's screening process is not good enough to weed out unsuitable applicants. They called the process "imperfect" and "not foolproof" and said that mistakes are made. When one of the justices responded that the lawyer for the agency was acknowledging his system to be a failure, the lawyer said the Department of Human Services was doing the best it could but that people lie and "slip through" their process. He later backpedaled and said he had misspoken, but in the process he asserted the problem was everywhere and that caseworkers are overworked and the agency does not have sufficient funding.

So this is what it's come to. There is no response to the assertion of the plaintiffs, echoed by judges on the court, that no one is allowed to foster or adopt a child without first going through an agency or judicial approval process. So apparently to justify excluding an entire category of applicants from the opportunity to show that a placement in their home is in the best interest of a child, the government lawyer must argue that his agency is not capable of doing its job properly. I find it impossible to imagine that the Arkansas Supreme Court will base its decision on such reasoning.

The lawyer for the plaintiffs reiterated the individual process each applicant goes through. He said that any studies about groups of children are irrelevant because of that, but he did further argue that whatever correlation there may be between "cohabitation" and child outcome does not demonstrate that the cohabitation causes the problems. He also told that court that it could not rule against the gay and lesbian plaintiffs without overruling the court's decision in Howard. In that case a unanimous court struck down an administrative regulation preventing a gay person or anyone living with a gay person from being licensed as a foster parent. The authors of both the majority and concurring opinions in Howard remain on the bench.

One of the court's newest justices, Courtney Hudson Henry, asked the lawyer for the intervenors the last question of the argument. She noted that a gay person living alone with multiple sexual partners is eligible to adopt, as long as that person doesn't live with a partner. (I wish she has left the qualifier "gay" off her statement, as it is true for a heterosexual with multiple partners as well). The response she received was that the ban is concerned with the dynamics and volatility of cohabiting relationships and break ups and there are a variety of reasons an individual might be denied the ability to adopt or be a foster parent.

And so it has come to this. The same state that cannot be trusted be weed out cohabiting couples whose homes are not good for children can be trusted to weed out single applicants whose homes are allegedly bad for children because they sleep around (without having police go snooping in their homes, which everyone agrees Jegley does not allow). Of course, that's not the point. In fact, the point of the ban has nothing to do with children and everything to do with stigmatizing both same-sex and unmarried different-sex relationships. I don't think the Arkansas Supreme Court is buying it.

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Fifth Circuit hears argument en banc tomorrow on case testing interstate recognition of adoption decrees

Early last year, a panel of the Fifth US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Adar v. Smith that Louisiana was required to issue a new birth certificate naming two men as the parents of a child born in Louisiana, after the couple adopted the child together in New York. The Louisiana registrar of vital records refused to issue the birth certificate with both fathers' names because unmarried couples are not permitted to adopt in Louisiana.

Well, the court granted the state's motion for rehearing en banc, and tomorrow all the judges on the 5th Circuit will hear oral argument in the case. The state is making an insidious argument that threatens the validity of all second-parent adoptions across state lines. While conceding that the adoptions are valid in the states where they were issued and bind the parties who litigated in all states, Louisiana is arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution does not require it to enforce an adoption decree that is against its public policy.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to enforce judgments from the courts of other states, without regard to their own public policies. A state is not required, however, to give Full Faith and Credit to another state's laws. An adoption decree is a judgment, but Louisiana is saying that the law that allowed a gay male couple to adopt in New York is what is really at issue and it is not required to give Full Faith and Credit to that, at least when it comes to enforcement through issuing a birth certificate that could not be issued under Louisiana's laws.

It's an argument that should lose. The 10th Circuit ruled four years ago in Finstuen v. Crutcher that an Oklahoma statute refusing to recognize adoptions from other states by same-sex couples and provide new birth certificates was unconstitutional. In the pending case, Louisiana tries to distinguish that opinion, but also argues that it was just plain wrong. If the 5th Circuit sides with the state, that will set up a Circuit split that could only be resolved by the US Supreme Court.

The state's argument also reminds me of the permutations argued by Lisa Miller in the longstanding litigation over Virginia's obligation to recognize Vermont's determination that Janet Jenkins is a parent of the child they planned together and entitled to visitation or custody. While that case turned on a specific federal statute requiring recognition of custody rulings from other states, rather than on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, after Miller lost on Virginia's obligation to recognize the Vermont order she argued that the statute did not require Virginia to enforce the Vermont order. It's a distinction with no legal difference, and Miller keeps losing.

While this case involves two men, Oren Adar and Mickey Rae Smith, Lousiana claims it would not issue an amended birth certificate for any unmarried couple who adopted a child born in Louisiana, because Lousiana prohibits such adoptions. A friend of the court brief filed on behalf of two law professors, Joan Hollinger and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, and one of the most distinguished family law practitioner in Texas, Harry Tindall, who was chair of the committee that wrote changes to the Uniform Parentage Act, argues that this is unconstitutional discrimination against children of unmarried parents. I find it no accident that the first US Supreme Court case declaring discrimination against nonmarital children unconstitutional also came from Louisiana.

Lousiana's response to this? Essentially they say that while it is unconstitutional to discriminate against a child born to an unmarried couple, it is not unconstitutional to discriminate against a child adopted by an unmarried couple. Really.

The court will release a recording of the oral argument (here), but probably not until next week.

Monday, June 28, 2010

William L. Taylor, 1931-2010

Civil rights lawyer, William L. (Bill) Taylor, died today at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland. I knew him also as the father of Lauren Taylor, one of my oldest friends.

Bill was responsible for the strategy that, in 1987, led the Senate to defeat President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to sit on the Supreme Court. The Justice we got instead was Anthony Kennedy, author of the Court's two landmark gay rights cases, Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas. Just today, Kennedy was the swing vote in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Court's ruling upholding the right of Hastings Law School to deny official recognition to a student group that excluded unrepentant gay men and lesbians.

Because of Bill's role in Bork's defeat, without which Kennedy would not serve on the Court, I feel enormous gratitude for Bill's efforts and for the benefits that the LGBT community reaped as a result of his work. Bork would have been Scalia's evil twin; when it comes to gay rights, Kennedy has been Scalia's nemesis.

I've written more about Bill's contribution and his passing here. Thank you, Bill. Your memory is a blessing.

Thursday, June 3, 2010

Texas Supreme Court lets stand ruling in favor of nonbio mom

The Texas appeals courts are split on whether a child is entitled to maintain a relationship with a nonbiological mother when the lesbian couple raising the child splits up. Last month I wrote about a terrible decision, but last December a different appeals court ruled that a nonbio mom, K.V., could proceed to trial on her claim for visitation rights with her daughter, M.K.S.

Because of the split among the Texas appeals courts, lawyers for K.V. feared that the Texas Supreme Court would grant review of the appeals court ruling in her favor. Last week, the Texas Supreme Court declined to do so. That means K.V. can proceed to trial on the best interests of M.K.S. and that, at least in some parts of Texas, children of lesbian couples need not lose their relationship with one of their mothers when that couple splits up.

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

Texas rebuffs nonbio mom...in spite of previous court order with bio mom's consent

Sheila Haley and Charlena Renee Smith went to court in 2002, when their twin children were four months old, and obtained the equivalent of a joint custody order giving them both rights to the children. Those children were born to Smith. Haley then bore a child using the same semen donor. When the couple split up in 2008, Smith denied Haley access to the twins and got a court order declaring the earlier joint custody order void because there wasn't any real dispute between the parties at the time. (Also it appears that they should have waited until the children were six months old to file, although I doubt that would have made a difference to the court.) (Background to the case here).

Well the Texas appeals court last month rebuffed Haley's efforts to remain connected to the lives of her children. The appeals court ruled that Haley lacked standing under the relevant Texas statute because, at all the times she was parenting the children, their bio mom, Smith, was also caring for them. This case sets up a split in Texas over this issue. (See my post on a ruling from a different court of appeal in favor of the nonbio mom). That means the Texas Supreme Court is likely to have the last word, and its ruling on this issue will be the law all over Texas.

This latest appeals court ruling just refused to see the difference between planning for and raising children together as two parents and a third party helping a parent raise her children. The court refers to a case in which grandparents were denied standing even though their grandchildren had lived with them, because the children's parents were also living in the home and caring for them. But that situation is completely different from the typical lesbian couple planning for and raising children together. Haley and Smith appear to be such a typical lesbian couple.

The ruling is primiarily based on Texas statutes concerning who may file for custody/visitation, otherwise known as standing to file; without standing a court does not even hear evidence about the well-being of the children. But the court also suggests that the constitutional right of parents to raise their children is violated if it is too easy for third parties to file for custody. This is also an issue other courts have considered. I especially like the rulings in past few months from Kentucky and California. Haley should be considered a parent, in which case she would also possess the constitutional right to raise her children. Had the children been born in the District of Columbia under our current law, both women would be the legal parents of these children.

Some Texas courts do grant second-parent adoptions. But Texas is also the land where by state statute an adopted child's revised birth certificate cannot list the names of two mothers or two fathers, even when a court in another state has granted a second-parent adoption. I'm not too optimistic about how the Texas Supreme Court will rule on this issue...

Thursday, February 18, 2010

Louisiana must issue birth certificate naming two dads

After Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith completed an adoption in New York of a child born in Louisiana, the couple sought a new Louisiana birth certificate for the child containing the names of the two men as her parents. Louisiana refused to do it, saying it was against the state's public policy to recognize two fathers for the child.

The federal district court in Louisiana ordered the state to issue the birth certificate. Today that decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit US Court of Appeals. Thank you, Full Faith and Credit Clause. That's the section of the US Constitution that requires states to recognize the court judgments of other states. This provision is the absolute key to assuring that children who are the subject of adoption decrees or parentage orders in one state will still have two parents when they move to another state. The Adar v. Smith (Smith happened to be the name of Louisiana's State Registrar -- no relation to Adar's partner, Mickey Smith) ruling restates what the US Supreme Court has said continuously, that there is no "public policy" exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Judgments from a state court are different from a state's statutes. Statutes are not entitled to Full Faith and Credit. Had Adar and Smith become parents of their son by virtue of their marriage or civil union, for example, Louisiana might not have been required to recognize their dual parentage. It's a word to the wise for all same-sex couples having children. Get to a lawyer. Get a court order.

Louisiana could petition the US Supreme Court to review the decision of the 5th Circuit. I'd bet my legal career the Supreme Court would choose not to hear the case. The 5th Circuit also governs Mississippi and Texas, so those states, too, have now been read the riot act on trying to get out of what the Full Faith and Credit clearly requires, whether they want children to have two same-sex parents or not.

Thursday, December 17, 2009

Texas court does about face -- recognizes non-bio mom

A few months ago, I wrote about a Texas appeals court ruling that a nonbio mom could not file for custody or visitation of a child she had co-parented. In a move that surprised everyone, the court reversed itself earlier this month. The nonbio mom had filed a routine petition for rehearing, something almost never granted. The court sat on the petition and then, rather than grant that petition, it released a ruling on its own vacating the earlier judgment and issuing a new opinion...in the nonbio mom's favor!

The court ruled that K.V. was "a person, other than a foster parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition" and that therefore she could file her petition. It referred to prior court decisions involving a stepmother and a grandmother who were able to maintain their actions. Her are the facts that mattered to the court:

K.V. and T.S. met in the fall of 1997 and began living together in late 1998. The two talked about rearing a child together and in mid-2003, after the two had received counseling, T.S. became pregnant with M.K.S. through artificial insemination by a sperm donor. T.S. delivered M.K.S. on May 21, 2004 and co-parented M.K.S. with K.V. until August 3, 2005 when the relationship ended and T.S. moved out with M.K.S. Because T.S. and K.V. wanted to maintain some continuity for the child, they agreed on a schedule allowing K.V. regular access to and possession of the child. ... From August 5, 2005 through April 25, 2007, during the school year, M.K.S. visited K.V. overnight once a week, alternative Sunday afternoons, and alternative weekends beginning on Friday afternoons. During the summer, the weekend visits sometimes started on Thursday afternoon. M.K.S. also visited K.V. on some holidays.

M.K.S. had her own room at K.V.'s house where she kept her toys, movies, a television, and an aquarium. She had a sandbox and a slide set outside. K.V. also modified her house by building a wrap around deck with gates on it so that the child would have a safe environment in which to play. There were occasions when K.V. would pick the child up from school when she was sick and then purchase and administer medication. K.V. was listed as a parent on the child's school records. K.V. also attended school activities and the teachers were aware that K.V. would pick the child up from school during her periods of possession. Witnesses testified that T.S. has referred to K.V. as the child's mother and treats K.V. as one of the child's parents. K.V. also established a college fund for M.K.S. After the relationship between K.V. and T.S. ended, the couple continued to attend church with the child as a family unit. T.S. discontinued K.V.'s visits with M.K.S. on April 25, 2007. The original petition was filed on May 23, 2007.

[T]he record does not suggest this pattern of possession and caregiving was intended to be a temporary arrangement. To the contrary, the possession agreement and the parties' actions evinced an intent that the child occupy K.V.'s home consistently over a substantial period of time. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in determining that K.V. did not establish the six month period of actual care, custody, and control requisite to establish her standing to file [a petition].

This is an amazing win, although of course there will have to be a trial now on how much contact will be allowed between K.V. and her daughter.

Friday, October 30, 2009

Obama administration again validates gay and lesbian parents

The US Justice Department filed a memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss today in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States, the lawsuit brought by Massachusetts arguing that the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional. This lawsuit complements the one brought by GLAD on behalf of several named plaintiffs.

The Justice Department memorandum reiterates that the administration supports repeal of DOMA but must nonetheless defend its constitutionality. It makes no explicit argument that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification entitled to heightened Equal Protection scrutiny; rather it says that the court is bound by a First Circuit US Court of Appeals ruling to that effect. I confess that my aggravation with the memorandum was tempered, as I read it, with the knowledge that any such document filed by a Republican administration would say vile and offensive things about us. By that measure, this is surely an improvement.

And the administration once again took the opportunity to distant itself from assertions that we are bad parents. Here's the footnote in full (check out how the government says the Scalia dissent in Lawrence, meant to scare everyone into thinking that decriminalizing sodomy would lead to same-sex marriage, is essentially correct!):

In this case, the government does not rely on certain purported interests set forth in the legislative history of DOMA, including the purported interests in “responsible procreation and child-rearing” -- that is, the assertions that (1) the government’s interest in “responsible procreation” justifies limiting marriage to a union between one man and one woman, and (2) that the government has an interest in promoting the raising of children by both of their biological parents. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 12-13, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2916-17. Since the enactment of DOMA, many leading medical, psychological, and social welfare organizations have issued policies opposing restrictions on lesbian and gay parenting upon concluding, based on numerous studies, that children raised by gay and lesbian parents are as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents. See American Academy of Pediatrics, http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/pediatrics;109/2/339 (February 2002 policy statement); American Psychological Association, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/parents.html (July 2004 policy statement); American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, http://www.aacap.org/cs/root/policystatements/gaylesbiantransgenderandbisexualparentspolicystatement (June 1999 policy statement); American Medical Association, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/glbt-advisory-committee/ama-policy-regarding-sexual-orientation.shtml (AMA Policy Regarding Sexual Orientation); Child Welfare League of America, http://www.cwla.org/programs/culture/glbtqposition.htm (Position Statement on Parenting of Children by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults).
Furthermore, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003), Justice Scalia acknowledged in his dissent that encouraging procreation would not be a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples under the reasoning of the Lawrence majority opinion -- which, of course, is the prevailing law -- because “the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.” Thus, the government does not believe that DOMA can be justified by interests in “responsible procreation” or “child-rearing.”

Wednesday, September 2, 2009

Will New York finally get it right for children of lesbian couples?

It's almost 20 years since the highest court in New York ruled that a child planned for by a lesbian couple, born to one partner using donor insemination, and raised as the child of two mothers, nonetheless has only one legal parent; and that legal parent has complete autonomy to decide whether the child maintains a relationship with the nonbio mom once the couple splits up. No exceptions.

This isn't Texas. Or Missouri. Or another state known for hostility to same-sex couples raising children. (Texas won't allow the names of two same-sex adoptive parents to appear on the birth certificate of a child born in Texas but adopted elsewhere; Missouri has more reported opinions denying custody to a gay or lesbian parent in favor of a straight ex-spouse than any other state in the country).

No, this is New York. But the case of Alison D v. Virginia M. was decided by the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) in 1991 and it established an iron-clad rule that a nonbiological parent has no standing to bring an action for custody or visitation rights. So unless the couple went to a lawyer and spent the money and time on a second-parent adoption, the child risks the loss of a parent, including the loss of financial support, if the couple splits up.

Well, that may change. Yesterday the court agreed to hear the case of Debra H. v. Janice R. The facts are not as undisputed as in most cases; the bio mom's (Janice's) position is that she decided to have the child on her own and that her ex-partner never functioned as the child's parent. Although the child had the nonbio mom's (Debra's) last name as a middle name and both moms were listed as parents on the naming certificate issued by the couple's synagogue (and on other papers), Janice says she made these decisions under pressure from Debra and to avoid conflict. Janice also signed a power of attorney appointing Debra as the child's guardian until his 21st birthday. The couple entered a civil union in Vermont during the pregnancy, and under Vermont law this confers a presumption of parentage on the nonbio partner, but Janice (a lawyer!) again says she was pressured into this and only did it because she knew a New York court would not recognize the relationship.

The trial court came up with a way around Alison D. It ruled that the Debra could try to prove that the Janice should be estopped from denying Debra's parentage. Estoppel is a legal concept that makes it difficult for a party to back away from a course of action that another party has relied upon over a period of time. The court ruled that if the non-bio mom could prove that she functioned as a parent to the child (in loco parentis), then estoppel would come into play and the court would decide custody and visitation based on the child's best interests.

Janice appealed before the judge actually held a hearing to determine the facts. The appeals court reversed, citing Alison D. No blood plus no adoption equals no legal status. No matter what. It is that ruling (all of five paragraphs long!) that the New York Court of Appeals agreed to review yesterday.

Did they take the case to overturn Alison D.? I sure hope so. California had a similarly bad decision on the books dating from 1991, but in the 2005 Elisa B. case the California Supreme Court overruled that decision. I'd like to think that in the almost two decades since Alison D. the reality of lives of children born to lesbian couples has permeated the understanding of the members of the Court. And of course the composition of the court has changed. None of the judges on the current court were on the court when Alison D. was decided.

There's a small clue in the court's ruling yesterday; the court ordered a resumption of the Sunday visitation that the trial court had ordered until there is a final ruling in the case. That means Debra will actually be able to see the 5 1/2 year old child immediately and throughout the time it takes to brief, argue, and decide the case. I'm taking that as a good sign.

Thanks to Art Leonard for alerting me promptly to the court's decision to hear this appeal.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

In Texas, another child loses a nonbio mom

It's discouraging to repeat the same story over and over. Here is the latest example of a bio mom eliminating a non-bio mom from a child's life...and getting away with it.

Bio mom, T.S., and non-bio mom, K.V., had a child through donor insemination. The child was given a hyphonated last name (S.-V.). The couple split up about 15 months later. For almost two years after that, the child lived with the bio mom and spent one overnight a week, alternate weekends, and some summer and holiday time with K.V. When K.V. accessed the child's school record without T.S.'s permission, T.S. cut off all contact, prompting K.V. to file a lawsuit.

In all these cases, the legal theories vary somewhat, depending upon what state law can support. For the details of the legal theories asserted in this case, read the whole opinion here. But the bottom line is so often the same; the court will not hear any evidence about the child's best interests because it finds that the non-bio mom has no right to bring an action for custody or visitation at all. That's what happened here.

I am assuming that the couple planned the insemination together and intended to both be parents, although the opinion is scant on facts because no amount of facts would make a legal difference to this court. But the opinion does say that the couple talked about having a child together, received counseling, and co-parented (that's the word the court uses) for the first 15 months while they lived together. Plus, the child's name was a hyphonated form of both moms' names. So in the District of Columbia, both these women would have been the legal parents of the child from the moment of birth.

Texas extends joint legal status to a nonbiological parent only when that parent is a man who is married to the woman who gives birth. That's no surprise. It's just sad.